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Chapter 28 • CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
2013 Annual Report1 
Key decisions at the intersection of constitutional law and environmental, energy, 
and natural resources law in 2013 occurred in the areas of standing, Commerce Clause, 
political question doctrine, preemption, takings, due process, First Amendment, Tenth 
Amendment, and state constitutional law. 
I. STANDING
 Plaintiffs must prove (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability in order 
to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution.2 Plaintiffs generally must also 
satisfy requirements of prudential standing, including the requirement that they allege an 
injury that falls within the zone of interest of the relevant statute.  
 In Texas v. EPA, Texas, Wyoming, and industry groups sought review of 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decisions implementing the Clean Air Act’s 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) framework for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from stationary sources.3 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petitions, holding that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing. That holding was based on the court’s interpretation of 
Clean Air Act section 165 that requires new and modified major sources of air pollution 
to secure a pre-construction permit and incorporate the “best available control technology 
[BACT] for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter.”4 The court held that 
section 165 is “self-executing,” meaning that once EPA regulated GHG emissions from 
cars and trucks, the Act itself imposed technology and permitting requirements absent 
any regulatory action. Because the petitioners were injured by section 165, and not EPA’s 
rules, the court held that the petitioners lacked standing. In reaching its decision, the court 
rejected an argument that the two states had standing because of the “special solicitude” 
owed to them under Massachusetts v. EPA.5 The court suggested that states receive such 
solicitude only when they seek to enforce a federal statute, rather than impede its 
application. Moreover, the court explained, notwithstanding any “special solicitude,” 
states must identify “a concrete and particularized injury in fact.”6 On October 15, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case.7 
 The Ninth Circuit also considered standing in the context of climate change in 
Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon.8 In that case, environmental organizations 
1This report was edited and authored in part by Michael Burger, Associate Professor, 
Roger Williams University School of Law, with contributions from Sidney F. Ansbacher, 
shareholder, GrayRobinson, P.A.; Marcia J. Cleveland; Gary S. Edinger, partner, 
Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A.; Helen Kang, Associate Professor and 
Director of the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Golden Gate University School of 
Law; Mark Patrick McGuire, Associate Legal Counsel, Narragansett Bay Commission; 
Stephen R. Miller, Associate Professor and Director, Economic Development Clinic, 
University of Idaho College of Law – Boise; and Justin Pidot, Assistant Professor, 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  
2Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
3726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
442 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2012). 
5549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
6726 F.3d at 199. 
7726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, No. 12-1269 (Oct. 15, 2013). 
8732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013). 
338 
sued Washington environmental agencies alleging that those agencies failed to implement 
technology based standards to control GHG emissions at the state’s five refineries. The 
Ninth Circuit, assuming without deciding that members of the environmental groups had 
adequately established injury-in-fact by identifying climate-related harms to their 
recreational and aesthetic interests, held that plaintiffs lacked standing on causation and 
redressability grounds. The court rejected as “conclusory,” the environmental groups’ 
claim that the state agencies failure to regulate “caused” their injury because regulation 
would have reduced emissions from the refineries. The court suggested that establishing a 
“causal nexus” between specific sources and climate injuries is “particularly challenging” 
because “there is a natural disjunction between Plaintiffs’ localized injuries and the 
greenhouse effect.” For those same reasons, the court held that plaintiffs’ could not 
demonstrate redressability. The court distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, explaining that plaintiffs’ could not avail themselves of a relaxed 
standing standard because they were private parties and not states. The court also 
explained that plaintiffs could not even meet the standard for causation provided by 
Massachusetts because the amount of GHGs emitted by the refineries was too small to 
constitute a “meaningful contribution” to climate change.9 
 The Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit each issued important opinions 
addressing probabilistic injury. In NRDC v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit found there was 
standing where an environmental group challenged a conditional registration for 
pesticides containing small particles of silver—referred to by the name AGS-20—for 
application to textiles and clothes as an anti-microbial chemical, and alleged that the 
children of its members would be exposed to it.10 In so doing, the court did not address 
the likelihood that exposure to AGS-20 would result in adverse health consequences.  
Instead, it treated the risk of exposure as an adequate injury and held that NRDC had 
standing because it had demonstrated a “‘credible threat’ that a probabilistic harm will 
materialize.”11  
 The Second Circuit took a similar approach in NRDC v. FDA.12 In that case, an 
environmental group challenged FDA’s regulation of two chemicals, triclosan and 
triclocarban, both used in antiseptic soap. NRDC proffered an affidavit from a member 
that came into contact with triclosan in the workplace and identified evidence that 
triclosan can harm human health. The court held that this established injury-in-fact, 
notwithstanding significant uncertainty about whether and to what extent triclosan is 
harmful. The court explained that “the injury contemplated by exposure to a potentially 
harmful product is not the future harm that the exposure risks causing, but the present 
exposure to the risk.” Because NRDC demonstrated a “credible threat” of harm to its 
member’s health by showing that triclosan may be harmful, and the FDA could not 
determine that it is safe, NRDC adequately demonstrated injury. The court also rejected 
arguments by the government that NRDC failed to establish causation because its 
members could purchase non-triclosan antibacterial soap for themselves and bring that 
soap to work, or could try to persuade their employer to provide such soap. The court 
explained that the cost of purchasing an alternative soap product would itself constitute 
injury and that “the failure to take affirmative action to advocate with an employer does 
not render the exposure to triclosan at the hands of the employer ‘self-inflicted’ so as to 
defeat standing.” The court took a different view of NRDC’s allegations regarding 
triclocarban. NRDC alleged that approval and subsequent use of triclocarbon could lead 
9Id. at 1142-43, 1145-46. 
10735 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2013). 
11Id. at 878. 
12710 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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to antibiotic-resistant bacteria that could infect its members. The court held that 
allegation too “contingent and far-off” to constitute injury-in-fact.13 
 Two courts also issued important decisions about the zone-of-interest component 
of prudential standing. In Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held 
that one industry petitioner lacked prudential standing to challenge new EPA air 
standards for certain lead smelters as insufficiently stringent.14 The petitioner asserted 
only an interest in increasing regulation on its competitors, and the court held that interest 
fell outside the zone of interest of the Clean Air Act. The court explained that, although 
the government did not raise prudential standing, it resolved the issue because the D.C. 
Circuit treats prudential standing as jurisdictional.15 Judge Silberman concurred to 
respond to a recent dissent in another case that had argued that prudential standing is not 
jurisdictional. Judge Silberman suggested that even if certain prudential standing 
doctrines lack a jurisdictional character, the zone of interest test is properly understood as 
a matter of statutory standing and that questions of statutory standing are jurisdictional.16 
 In Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell, the Ninth Circuit held that an environmental 
group lacked prudential standing to challenge the Fish and Wildlife Service’s operation 
of a fish hatchery as allegedly in violation of the Reclamation Act.17 The relevant section 
of the Reclamation Act requires that federal reclamation projects comply with state water 
law.18 The Wild Fish Conservancy alleged that diverting water to operate the hatchery 
violated Washington water law because the Fish and Wildlife Service had not secured a 
permit for the diversion from the Washington Department of Ecology and, therefore, the 
hatchery violated the Reclamation Act. The court explained that Washington water law 
does not permit citizen suits, but rather, entrusts enforcement to the state government. 
Because the purpose of the Reclamation Act is to respect state sovereignty, the 
Conservancy fell outside of its zone of interest when it attempted to use federal law as a 
means of enforcing a provision of state law for which the state vested exclusive 
enforcement authority in a state agency.19  
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress 
shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”20 In its 
positive form the Commerce Clause is the source of constitutional authority underlying 
most federal environmental laws. In its negative or “dormant” form it prevents states 
from adopting protectionist laws that erect barriers to interstate commerce or attempt to 
control commerce beyond the state's borders. 
When the Supreme Court declined to uphold under the Commerce Power the 
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate to buy health insurance,21 it inspired analogous 
challenges to environmental statutes.22 In Voggenthaler v. Maryland Square, LLC the 
13Id. at 74, 80-81, 84-86. 
14716 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
15Id. at 674. 
16Id. at 675-76 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
17730 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013). 
1843 U.S.C. § 383 (2012). 
19Id. at 794, 797-99. 
20U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.   
21Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-94 (2012). 
22United States v. Sterling Centrecorp, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-02556, 2013 WL 3214384 at 
*21, (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2013).
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Ninth Circuit rejected such a challenge to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).23 In that case, the State of Nevada sued 
under CERCLA to require the owners and operators of a shopping mall to pay for 
cleaning up groundwater contaminated by discharges of dry cleaning fluids. The 
defendants argued that CERCLA could not constitutionally apply to this site because the 
affected groundwater is not in interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit held that 
groundwater is an article in interstate commerce and both the dry cleaning business and 
the remediation of the site are in and affect interstate commerce.24  
Regarding the dormant Commerce Clause, in Tarrant Regional Water District v. 
Herrmann the Supreme Court denied a claim by a Texas water district that an Oklahoma 
law limiting water extraction licenses to Oklahoma residents was unconstitutional.25 The 
Court held that because the Red River Compact allocates all of the water in the watershed 
to the participating states, Oklahoma’s refusal to let Texas extract water in Oklahoma 
implements a federally authorized water management scheme and does not impermissibly 
interfere with interstate commerce. 
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey the Ninth Circuit upheld California's 
Fuel Standard against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.26 The Fuel Standard 
implements the transportation part of California's Global Warming Solutions Act, 
regulating the carbon intensity of fuel blended and sold in California. The law sets 
decreasing annual caps on carbon intensity of ethanol and crude oil and requires blenders 
and producers to show that their fuels are under the limit.27 A blender or producer can 
comply either by using the average carbon intensity for his region and production method 
or by calculating the actual carbon intensity of his fuel. The rule specifies averages for 
different methods of producing ethanol in three regions: California, the Midwest and 
Brazil. The crude oil rule works in a similar manner, but all but one type of producer 
must use the averages. 28 
Because the rule groups the carbon intensity averages by region, plaintiffs 
claimed that it was facially discriminatory and barred by the dormant Commerce Clause. 
The district court agreed and enjoined the Fuel Standard, but the Ninth Circuit reversed 
holding that the Fuel Standard discriminated among fuels based on their carbon intensity. 
Location only affected two components of the calculation and sometimes favored 
Midwest blenders over California companies. Thus, the fact that the rule used a state 
boundary to group producers with similar characteristics did not render it facially 
discriminatory. The court also rejected claims that the crude oil standard had a 
discriminatory purpose or effect and that the Fuel Standard was an attempt to regulate 
commerce outside of California.29 The court remanded the case to the district court to 
consider whether the ethanol part of the Fuel Standard had a discriminatory purpose or 
effect that would require strict scrutiny and if not to apply the balancing test set forth in 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.30  
23724 F.3d 1050, 1059-62 (9th Cir. 2013). 
24Id. at 1058, 1059-60.   
25133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013). 
26730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
27“Carbon intensity” is a measure of the carbon emitted by a unit of fuel throughout its 
lifecycle of production, transportation and use. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 
95481(a)(16) (2012). 
28730 F.3d at 1079-84. 
29Id. at 1089-94, 1101.  
30397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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In Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin the Second Circuit held that 
a dormant Commerce Clause claim was not ripe because the power purchase agreement 
that the plaintiffs claimed would require them to sell power to Vermont utilities below the 
market rates for other states had not yet been entered into.31 The court however expressed 
grave doubts that such an agreement could pass muster under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  
III. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
Last year’s chapter noted that the Fifth Circuit would have an opportunity in 2013 
to pass on the possible implications of American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut32 for 
applying the political question doctrine to claims that climate change impacts constitute a 
public nuisance under state law. In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA the court declined that 
opportunity, ruling instead that the re-filed claims made by property owners that certain 
power and chemical companies’ GHGs contributed to climate change, and that climate 
change in turn exacerbated the harmful effects of Hurricane Katrina, were barred by res 
judicata.33 
One district court case bears noting. In Alaska v. Kerry, the State of Alaska sued 
the U.S. Secretary of State and EPA, among others, challenging federal enforcement of 
low-sulfur fuel requirements for marine vessels operating in certain coastal waters.34 The 
Secretary implemented the requirements pursuant to the United States’ obligations as a 
party to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, under 
the authority granted him by the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships. The court applied 
the multi-factor test established in Baker v. Carr35 and found the state’s claims non-
justiciable. 
IV. DISPLACEMENT AND PREEMPTION
The preemption doctrine relies on the principle that federal law is the “supreme 
Law of the Land.”36 Preemption of state law by federal legislation can be either express 
or implied. Express preemption derives from the explicit language of a statute.
Preemption may be implied where Congress completely occupies the subject field (field 
preemption) or else when state law conflicts with federal law (conflict preemption). 
In Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, discussed above, the Supreme 
Court rejected a claim that the Red River Compact created cross-border rights for a Texas 
water district that preempted Oklahoma water laws and held that the Compact’s silence 
on the issue of preemption reflected an intention among the Compact’s drafters to respect 
state borders.37 In construing the preemptive reach of the Compact, the Court was 
persuaded by three factors: “the well-established principle that States do not easily cede 
their sovereign powers, including their control over waters within their own territories; 
the fact that other interstate water compacts have treated cross-border rights explicitly; 
and the parties’ course of dealing.”38     
31733 F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
32131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
33718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).  
343:12-cv-00142, 2013 WL 5269760 (D. Alaska, Sept. 17, 2013).  
35369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
36U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
37133 S. Ct. 2120, 2129-2136 (2013); see discussion supra Section II. 
38Id. at 2132. 
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In American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court held 
that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) expressly 
preempts two contract provisions that the Port of Los Angeles sought to impose on 
drayage trucking companies as part of the port’s Clean Air Action Plan.39 The provisions, 
designed to help alleviate community and environmentalist opposition to the port’s 
expansion, required any company providing drayage trucking services to a marine 
terminal operator at the Port to develop an off-street parking plan and to display specified 
placards on its vehicles.40 The FAAAA, however, provides that “a State [or local 
government] may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the 
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with 
respect to the transportation of property.”41 The Ninth Circuit had held that the contract 
provisions do not have “the force and effect of law” because they reflect the Port’s 
“business interest” and were “designed to address [a] specific proprietary problem,” 
namely community opposition to the Port’s plans to increase shipping activity.42 In a 
unanimous opinion the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that because the Port 
threatened to impose criminal penalties on marine terminal operators for a contracting 
trucking company’s noncompliance the Port was operating in its regulatory capacity and 
the provisions had the effect of law. Notably, the court also declined to address the 
potential scope of the market participant exception to statutory preemption in this 
context.43   
The Courts of Appeal issued a number of opinions regarding the preemptive reach 
of different parts of the Clean Air Act. In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the Third 
Circuit held that the Clean Air Act did not preempt private property owners’ putative 
class action tort law claims of nuisance, negligence, and trespass based on the settling of 
a power plant’s flying ash and unburned coal combustion byproducts on private 
property.44 The court, consistent with decisions from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 
reasoned that the plain language of the Clean Air Act’s savings clause allows states to 
impose stricter standards than the federal government and that citizens may seek 
enforcement of any such state emission standard or limitation.45 
In another case, the Second Circuit held that the Clean Air Act did not impliedly 
preempt state tort law claims arising from the contamination of groundwater by the 
organic chemical compound methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE).46 In affirming the 
district court’s decision in the bellwether trial for consolidated multidistrict MTBE 
litigation, the Second Circuit panel rejected the argument that, as a practical matter, the 
Act required gasoline manufacturers to use MTBE to satisfy the Act’s federal oxygenate 
requirement and therefore it would be impossible to comply with both the statute and 
state common law. The court also rejected the argument that a tort remedy would pose an 
obstacle to accomplishment of the Act’s objectives in establishing the Reformulated 
Gasoline Program.47 
                                                 
39133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013). 
40Id. at 2100. 
4149 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012). 
42133 S. Ct. at 2101. 
43Id. at 2102 n.4, 2103-04. 
44734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013).  
45Id. at 195-97.  
46In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
47Id. at 97-101, 101-03.  
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Finally, in Ass’n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas the Fifth Circuit 
upheld an incentive program offering taxicabs utilizing compressed natural gas (CNG) 
“head-of-the-line” privileges at Love Field, a municipally-owned airport, against a 
preemption challenge.48 The court held that the program did not establish a “standard” 
under the plain meaning of section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act. The court also held that 
plaintiffs had failed to establish by record evidence that the indirect economic effects on 
non-CNG taxi-owners were sufficiently “acute” to force them to either convert to CNG 
or else abandon the business.    
In Dominion Transmission Inc. v. Summers, a case about the preemptive reach of 
the Natural Gas Act but with Clean Air Act implications, the D.C. Circuit held that state 
law provisions demanding certification of a gas compressor station’s compliance with 
local zoning and land use requirements, incorporated by reference into Maryland’s State 
Implementation Plan and approved by EPA under the Clean Air Act, were saved from 
preemption by section 3(d) of the Natural Gas Act.49   
The Courts of Appeal also weighed in on the preemptive reach of several other 
laws. In Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Village of Hobart, Wisconsin, the 
Seventh Circuit held that federal Indian law preempted a Wisconsin village from 
imposing stormwater management charges on parcels of land owned by the United States 
in trust for the tribe.50 And in Waldburger v. CTS Corp. the Fourth Circuit held that the 
discovery rule established by CERCLA extends to state statutes of repose, as well as state 
statutes of limitation.51 In the case, a North Carolina law imposed a ten-year limitation on 
the accrual of real property claims, without regard for the plaintiff's knowledge of harm. 
Section 9658 of CERCLA, in contrast, establishes that all claims accrue on the date a 
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known an injury was caused or contributed to 
by a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant. The court reasoned that the 
remedial purposes of the statute demanded a liberal construction of the discovery rule’s 
applicability to state timing limitations.52 
 
V. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE 
 
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken “for public 
use, without just compensation.”53 There are two kinds of Fifth Amendment takings: 
physical takings and regulatory takings. A physical taking occurs where there is a “direct 
government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.”54 A regulatory taking 
may occur where there is no physical taking but government action nonetheless “affect 
and limit” the use of private property “to such an extent that a taking occurs.”55  
The Supreme Court Term issued two takings decisions in 2013. In Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District,56 the Court weighed the argument that the 
District’s request (or demand) for fee in lieu of mitigation to pay for one or the other of 
two District projects constituted a taking or exorbitant exaction. A 5-4 majority extended 
                                                 
48720 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2013). 
49723 F.3d 238, 243-44 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
50732 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2013). 
51723 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2013). 
52Id. at 439-41, 443-44 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9658). 
53U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. 
54Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).  
55Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
56133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,57 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,58 finding that 
government exactions must bear an “essential nexus” and be roughly proportionate to the 
impacts of the development that the exactions seek to mitigate. The majority and dissent 
agreed to this point.59 They differed on the import of that analysis. The majority held that 
a land use exaction fee that goes too far “confiscat[es] property” and may require just 
compensation.60 The dissent argued that monetary exactions that go too far require refund 
of overcharges, not a takings analysis.61  
Horne v. Department of Agriculture62 determined that a federal court has 
jurisdiction to hear a takings challenge to a United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) administrative order that imposed sanctions on alleged raisin handlers under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals to consider the Hornes’ Fifth Amendment claim that the USDA took their 
private property by assessing them substantial penalties for refusing to donate a 
substantial share of their raisin crop for various federal programs in part as a price 
support mechanism. The Court rejected the federal government argument that the claim 
was not ripe under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 
even though the Hornes refused to pay the fines.63 
In Lost Tree Village v. United States,64 the Federal Circuit held that the “relevant 
parcel” for a takings claim was only the platted parcel for which the developer sought a 
section 404 dredge and fill permit from the Army Corps. The court refused to “extend 
[the relevant parcel] to all of a landowner’s disparate holdings in the vicinity of the 
regulated parcel.” The court concluded the determinative factor was whether the 
developer treated other parcels as “part of the same economic unit.” Absent that, “the 
mere fact that the properties are commonly owned and located in the same vicinity is an 
insufficient basis on which to find they constitute a single parcel for purposes of the 
takings analysis.”65 
The Fourth Circuit took up two cases weeks apart that dealt with challenges to the 
Town of Nags Head, North Carolina’s declaration that beachfront lands that encroached 
on public trust lands were abatable public nuisances. In Town of Nags Head v. 
Toloczko,66 the appellate court reversed the district court’s abstention under the Burford 
doctrine.67 The appellate court noted that state and local land use and zoning are 
“paradigm[atic]” Burford issues, particularly as applied to the state’s public trust doctrine 
established pursuant to its Equal Footing rights, but distinguished the case, because North 
Carolina law is settled that only the state may bring an action to enforce the state’s public 
trust rights.68 While the public trust doctrine is an important, state-specific policy issue, 
                                                 
57483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
58512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
59Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591, 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
60Id. at 2602. 
61Id. at 2606 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998)). 
62133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013). 
63Id. at 2061-62 (citing Williamson Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172 (1985)). 
64707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
65Id. at 1292-93, 1294. 
66728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013).   
67Id. at 395-97 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)). The Burford 
Doctrine holds that the federal courts shall not interfere with important, unsettled policy 
matters that are reserved to the states. Burford, 319 U.S. at 333-34. 
68Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 396-97. 
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the court emphasized that Burford abstention does not apply where the state law is 
settled. Further, while Williamson69 would ordinarily bar the federal claim until state 
courts deny just compensation, the appellate court waived ripeness and finality to avoid 
piecemeal litigation.70 In Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head,71 the court upheld the lower 
court’s refusal to abstain, holding that the town waived Williamson by removing the case 
to federal court, thereby committing “procedural gamesmanship” of “forum 
manipulation.” 
  
VI. DUE PROCESS 
 
As in previous years, due process issues raised as claims72 or defenses73 in 
environmental cases were generally unsuccessful. Again as in the past, due process issues 
were one of many, and not the principal, arguments in a majority of environmental cases, 
and thus courts tended to give cursory attention to them.74  
Due process claims similarly failed where regulated parties claimed that they did 
not have fair notice of regulations that governed them.75 In Wisconsin Resources 
Protection Council v. Flambeau Mining Co.,76 however, in a Clean Water Act citizen suit 
alleging that a mining company lacked a stormwater discharge permit, the Seventh 
Circuit held that liability could not be established because the company lacked notice that 
a permit issued by the state, which is EPA-approved to administer its own national 
pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES) program, may be potentially invalid. In 
so holding, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the permit shield available to NPDES 
permit holders for compliance with such permits was also available to the mining 
company.  
                                                 
69473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
70Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 399. 
71724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir 2013). 
72E.g., Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2013) (where due 
process claim are alleged to seek review where the court does not have jurisdiction for 
such review, claim not allowed as “nothing more than a direct review”); Richter v. City 
of Des Moines, No. 12-35370, 2013 WL 4406689 (9th Cir. 2013) (no violation for 
alleged disparate treatment in permitting based on city’s predisposed ill feelings for 
permit applicant’s trail building without a prior permit); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of 
Fla. v. United States, 716 F.3d 535, 558-59 (11th Cir. 2013) (must allege inadequacy of 
process); Am. Whitewater v. Tidwell, No. 8:09-2665-MGL, 2013 WL 4038432 (D.S.C. 
2013) (no violation of interest in interstate travel and personal movement as travel 
available by other means); Friends of Maine’s Mountains v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 61 A.3d 
689 (Me. 2013) (no violation because lack of evidence to overcome presumption of good 
faith of hearing board accused of being partial to opposing party). 
73Comm’r of Envtl. Prot. v. Farricielli, 59 A.3d 789, 804 (Conn. 2013) (no violation in 
enforcement of an injunction against a nonparty in privity of a party where nonparty had 
actual or constructive notice of the injunction). 
74E.g., Sierra Club v. Moser, 310 P.3d 360 (Kan. 2013) (PSD permit given to Sunflower 
Electric amidst politically charged proceedings not invalid). 
75United States v. Exec. Recycling, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Colo. 2013) (no 
violation for use of agency guidance in jury instruction); Agency of Natural Res. v. 
Persons, 75 A.3d 582 (Vt. 2013) (no violation for failure to provide warning before 
issuing notice of violation and exact information about the location of wetlands). 
76727 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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In another case where substantive due process claims featured more prominently 
than usual for an environmental case, Hardesty v. Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality 
Management District, a company regulated by multiple regulatory agencies survived 
motions to dismiss based on allegations that government agencies acted with improper 
motive after a competitor exerted influence on the agencies.77 The case is still pending, 
with the due process claims not yet adjudged on the merits. The burden to prove that the 
government was motivated not by legitimate regulatory interests but by illegitimate 
reasons is “exceedingly high,”78 and thus whether it succeeds beyond the motion to 
dismiss stage, where the allegations are accepted as true, remains to be seen. On the other 
hand, Pioneer Aggregates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection,79 presenting similar issues of illegitimate interference with business rights, 
did not survive a motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient allegations. 
United States v. South Jersey Clothing Co.,80 presented a rather unique due 
process issue. Landowners down-gradient of a Superfund site sought relief from a 
consent decree incorporating settlement agreements between potentially responsible 
parties and their insurers. Noting that the landowners did not have notice that their rights 
might be cut off from releases that insurers were given in the settlement agreement, the 
court held the consent decree not to bar the landowners’ claims against the insurers 
should the state court determine that the landowners have a protectable interest.  
 
VII. FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
In the past year, there have been no major doctrinal changes in First Amendment 
jurisprudence as it relates to environmental, energy or natural resources issues. However, 
readers should be aware of one case that will be decided in 2014: Sebelius v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc..81 Sebelius involves a challenge to the Affordable Care Act brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Court is 
expected to decide whether corporations can have religious beliefs and, if so, whether 
they are entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.82 If answered in the 
affirmative, this may dramatically increase litigation brought under the First Amendment, 
RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which 
uses the same “substantial burden” standard as RFRA.  
RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling 
governmental interest.83 Because the statute is written with an intentionally broad scope, 
it applies to all manner of land use and environmental regulations. A few representative 
cases address the potential of this statute for breeding litigation in the field: In Eagle 
Cove Camp & Conference Center, Inc. v. Town of Woodboro, Wisconsin the Seventh 
Circuit turned aside a claim that land use regulations prohibiting a year-round Bible camp 
                                                 
77935 F. Supp. 2d 968 (E.D. Cal. 2013). 
78Richter v. City of Des Moines, No. 12-35370, 2013 WL 4406689 (9th Cir. 2013) 
79No. 12-4018, 2013 WL 4647301 (3d Cir. 2013). 
80No. 96-3166, 2013 WL 5467087 (D.N.J. 2013). 
81Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
No. 13-354 (Nov. 26, 2013). 
82The Tenth Circuit held that corporations are “persons” entitled to bring claims under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and that Free Exercise rights may extend to some for-
profit corporations. See 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).  
8342 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 
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in a residential zone violated RLUIPA and the First Amendment.84 The court found that 
the regulations did not substantially burden the exercise of religion and were also 
supported by a compelling state interest. In Washington v. Gonyea, the Second Circuit 
held that RLUIPA does not provide a private cause of action against state officials in 
their individual capacities.85 The law remains unsettled on this issue, although the 
national trend seems to be to disallow private causes of action against individual actors. 
This holding may limit the attractiveness of RLUIPA for many land use and 
environmental disputes.  
Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, Florida principally dealt 
with the issue of ripeness in the First Amendment context.86 The plaintiff claimed that the 
designation of its property as historic (which limited development) violated its rights 
under RLUIPA. The Eleventh Circuit found that “the mere fact of its designation as a 
historic landmark satisfy the fitness and hardship requirements of our traditional ripeness 
jurisprudence.”   
On the “free speech” side of the First Amendment, there are a few cases of 
interest. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger is an outgrowth of multi-billion dollar litigation in 
Ecuador concerning the alleged environmental depredations of Chevron.87 In this case, 
environmentalists, journalists and bloggers moved to quash a subpoena directed to 
Google and Yahoo claiming that their First Amendment speech and associational rights 
would be infringed upon if the servers were required to disclose the identity of those 
individuals. The court denied the relief finding that the First Amendment claims were 
attenuated and indefinite.  
The plaintiffs in Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service 
claimed that the decision of the Forest Service and a ranger to reduce the number of 
livestock grazing permits within a national forest was made in retaliation for their earlier 
protests.88 The individual claims against the ranger were dismissed, but the court found 
that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action for declaratory relief against the Forest Service 
for future violations.  
Finally, the 2012 Annual Report included a summary of a district court case 
involving a floating buffer zone that prohibited protests by environmentalists around 
vessels engaged in offshore drilling. That decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in 
Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc..89 The court wryly observed that free speech was 
not infringed because “Greenpeace USA has no audience at sea.” 
 
VIII. TENTH AMENDMENT 
 
The Tenth Amendment provides that “. . . powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”90   
In Texas v. EPA,91 Texas and Wyoming challenged several rules promulgated by 
EPA that impose permitting requirements for GHGs under the PSD provisions of the 
                                                 
84734 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2013). 
85731 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2013). 
86727 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2013). 
8712-mc-80237 CRB (NC), 2013 WL 4536808 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
88921 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (D.N.M. 2013). 
89709 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Michael Burger, et al., Constitutional Law, 
2012 ABA ENV’T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES L. YEAR IN REVIEW 338, 346. 
90U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
91726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also discussion supra Section I. 
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Clean Air Act in states without implementation plans for GHGs as of January 2, 2011. 
The States argued that the requirements constituted coercion and commandeering of the 
organs of state government in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and analogized the 
requirements to Congress’ threat to withhold all Medicaid funds from states in the 
Affordable Care Act provision found unconstitutional under the Spending Clause in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.92 The D.C. Circuit upheld the 
rules, finding that federal statutes that allow states to administer federal programs but 
provide for direct federal administration if a state chooses not to do so have long been 
held constitutional. Further, even if the new requirements forced a “significant” 
temporary construction delay for new major emitting facilities the States had not 
demonstrated such a delay was of the same magnitude and nature as the Medicaid 
expansion provision, which would have stripped over 10% of a state’s overall budget. 
Moreover, unlike the Medicaid provision, which threatened to “withhold all existing 
Medicaid funds from [s]tates unwilling to carry out the expansion,” EPA assumed 
authority over only the GHG emissions portion of the states’ PSD permitting programs.93   
 
IX. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
In Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources,94 a Wisconsin Supreme Court majority opinion held that the public trust rights 
of the State lay in lands below the ordinary high water line demarcating the boundary 
between uplands and navigable, non-tidal waters. A dissenting opinion countered that the 
public trust doctrine is not so “crabbed” by the common law boundaries.95 These two 
opinions provide strong arguments against and for the position of Joseph Sax in his 
landmark 1970 law review article that advocated expanding the public trust doctrine 
beyond navigable waters for robust environmental and natural resources protections.96 
In Democko v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources,97 the Iowa Supreme Court 
held that distinctions between resident and nonresident landowners in state issued special 
hunting licenses did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States 
Constitution. The court emphasized U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that the 
Clause “protects nonresidents from discrimination only with respect to ‘fundamental’ 
privileges or immunities.”98 The court relied on Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of 
Montana,99 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that recreational hunting is not a 
fundamental privilege protected by the Constitution. While Baldwin addressed the right 
of nonresidents to a state hunting license, Iowa statutes established the state’s “ownership 
or title in trust, to conserve natural resources for the benefit of all Iowans.”100 The court 
emphasized that “[t]he clear implication of this unqualified statute is that a landowner has 
no title to or interest in wildlife [in] the state borders, even if the wildlife is on the 
                                                 
92132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-06 (2012). 
93726 F.3d at 196, 197. 
94833 N.W.2d 800 (Wis. 2013). 
95Id. at 835-842 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
96Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
97No. 12-1944, 2013 WL6385733 (Iowa 2013). 
98Id. at *11 (citing United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. 
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984)). 
99436 U.S. 371 (1978). 
100Democko, No. 12-1944, at *12 (quoting Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d 
907, 914 (Iowa 1985)). 
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landowner’s property.”101 The court concluded that this allowed the State to grant only 
resident landowners the right to hunt certain wildlife on their lands without violating the 
Constitution.102 
In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania103 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court struck the controversial Act 13 that had virtually preempted oil and gas 
regulation to the state, precluding local zoning of such uses. A three justice plurality held 
that the Act violated the State Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment, which 
states that the Commonwealth holds natural resources in a public trust. The plurality 
seemed to hold that zoning implements a constitutionally stated public trust authority 
where zoning protects the state’s natural resources. The fourth member of the majority 
issued a concurring opinion stating that the statewide zoning standards violated 
substantive due process.104 The dissenting justices contended that the majority violated 
separation of powers, usurping the legislative fact finding and policy function, and failed 
to observe the status of local municipalities as creatures of state statute, subordinate to the 
state.105 
In Agency of Natural Resources v. Perrons,106 the Vermont Supreme Court 
rejected due process challenges to civil penalties for wetlands violations. The court held 
that civil penalties met lower due process thresholds than did criminal action. While no 
agency detailed the exact location of on-site wetlands, the defendants knew or should 
have known substantial wetlands existed there. The court emphasized: “As a landowner 
of protected wetlands, the onus is on him, individually, to ensure that he is conducting 
permissible activities in permitted areas.”107 
101Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 481A.2 (2013)). 
102Id. at *13. 
103Nos. 63 MAP 2012, 64 MAP 2012, 72 MAP 212, 73 MAP 2012, 2013 WL 6687290 
(Pa. 2013). 
104Id. at *77-85 (Baer, J., concurring). 
105Id. at *85-91 (Saylor, J., Eakin, J., dissenting). 
10675 A.3d 582 (Vt. 2013). 
107Id. at 588. 
